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REFLECTIONS ON SIXTY YEARS OF
WATER LAW PRACTICE*
GLENN SAUNDERS::

I have had a long history in the water business-longer than I ever
expected it to be from my first encounter in 1918. During World War
I, the Denver Union Water Company was short on responsible help. I
was a responsible boy, and a neighbor of the Water Company's Chief
Engineer. His chauffeur lived just behind us, so I had the opportunity
to drive in the Water Company's Stevens-Duryea open car to various
points in the Denver Union Water Company system. Consequently, in
the summer of 1918, 1 was hired to watch the float gauges on the clear
water basins at the Capitol Hill Pump Station in Denver. The pump
station supplied water to everyone east of the South Platte River.
These gauges had to be watched closely. There were many
wood-stave conduits in the Denver Union Water Company system. If
one of these gauges fell rapidly, it meant that a conduit had broken. If
a conduit broke, it needed to be known immediately because they provided Denver's principal supply of filtered water. At that time there
was no telemetric enunciator to locate the break, so it was important
that the gauges were watched constantly. When they fell, a notification
was immediately sent to Denver Union Water Company's central office. I worked there until November 1, 1918, when the city and county
of Denver took over the water plant from the Denver Union Water
Company after a long series of plant evaluation hearings in the United
States District Court.
During this time, I became familiar with the arguments as to
whether Denver, a municipal corporation, should own the Denver UnPreviously published in the Natural Resources Law Center Occasional Paper
Series, 1989. Reprinted with permission from the Natural Resources Law Center, Uni-
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ion Water Company, a private enterprise. My father was a right-wing
conservative and did not believe the government should do anything
other than run a police department. Our next-door neighbor, Ben
Sweet, was a member of the first Board of Water Commissioners and a
proponent of public ownership. I had the benefit of backyard, overthe-fence arguments about the merits of public ownership versus the
merits of private enterprise.
I returned to Denver from law school in 1929 at the commencement of the Great Depression. I had absolutely no regard for the
criminal law practice in which my father was busily engaged, so I went
to my old friend, then Mayor Ben Stapleton. As a widower, he helped
raise me and inculcated in me some of his own very high ideals.
Stapleton had three basic community objectives: (1) to develop an
adequate water supply derived from the tributaries of the Colorado
River; (2) to construct a major ground transportation vehicular system;
and (3) to build a major airport. Stapleton initiated the Valley Highway (now 1-25) through a design created by engineers Crocker and
Ryan. He also secured what is now known as Stapleton International
Airport. He had his friend, Brown Cannon, who ran Windsor Farm
Dairy, quietly acquire the airport land at dry-grazing land farm prices.
Stapleton told me the Denver Water Department had a brilliant attorney named Malcolm Lindsey who was special counsel for water matters. The then existing city charter made it the duty of the City Attorney to render all legal service required by the Board of Water
Commissioners. Stapleton pointed out that the City Attorney had so
many irons in the fire that it was necessary to have a special water
counsel. He wanted me to benefit from the tutelage of Malcolm
Lindsey and to devote a major part of my energies to help create a water supply for Denver. Stapleton said the city did not pay enough
money for a man to make a decent living, so if I went to work for the
Water Board, I should maintain the right to have a private practice.
He gave me this advice even though he expected me to devote most of
my attention to creating a water supply for Denver.
I went to work for the Water Board and found its legal affairs, except for the protection of its water rights, in shambles, because Charles
H. Haines, a very competent assistant city attorney who was assigned to
the Water Department, was overloaded with other city work. He welcomed me with open arms, bounced into my office, and tossed a request for an eminent domain proceeding on my desk. He said, 'You
will find out all about eminent domain in the 6300's of the 1921 Compiled Laws." Since I was not yet licensed to practice law, he said, 'Just
sign my name to things and call me on the phone if you think you
need any advice." I immediately found myself in the midst of a number of lawsuits. The Lock Joint Pipe Company had six miles of pipe
strewn out on public highways and no right-of-way to place the pipe.
There was no negotiation team to acquire the necessary property
rights, so I became the negotiation team, the lawyer, and the financial
adviser.
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Fortunately, the Water Board had an exceedingly competent manager named Hiriam Hiltz, who was a business executive for Henry M.
Porter. Porter endowed what is now the Porter Hospital. He left the
hospital to run the Water Department after integrating the Porter gift
shop into the hospital's business. With his help and my youthful energy, we soon had the Water Board's legal affairs in pretty good shape.
I began learning water law from Mr. Lindsey. Lindsey and I made
an excellent combination. He never went to law school, but he studied
law while working as a court reporter in Trinidad. He had a grassroots education. A very quiet man, he did not like the vigor of a headto-head contest. The adversarial process is what I enjoyed most about
practicing law. Consequently, I learned water law from him, and he sat
as a spectator while I conducted litigation. I had nothing to unlearn
about Colorado water law because the subject was not taught at the
University of Michigan, where I attended law school. This enabled me
to learn water law from people who were practicing it: people such as
Watt McKendrie of Pueblo, Bill Kelly of Greeley, and Frank Delaney of
Glenwood Springs. Many other fine water lawyers who were either a
part of our team or our adversaries followed these people.
At that time, members of the Board of Water Commissioners were
the type of people that could be found on the directorate of any important utility corporation, such as the public service company, the
telephone company, or the tramway. These men, except for A. P.
Gumlick, had their own businesses to tend to and expected Water
Board employees to take a leadership role in developing the water system. Gumlick, the President of the Water Board, and his wife were financially able to devote their energies to public service. I worked very
closely with Mr. Gumlick, the manager, the engineering division, and
the accounting division in planning the development of an adequate
water supply. Denver was already a major city. Centrally located, it
looked like it would probably always be a hub in the North American
continent with a permanence found in places like Rome and London.
I was always impressed with the fact that we were building a water system that would be utilized for centuries and that every move we made
would be magnified either for better or for worse. This impressed
upon me the necessity of doing the job right the first time so that it
would not have to be corrected at great expense in the future.
In the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, when Denver was most vigorously
developing its water supply system, the attitude of the public, the legislature, and the judiciary was generally the same as it had been since
the middle of the 19th Century: do everything you can to develop a
civilized community in this near desert country by developing our water resources for beneficial use. During the 1980's this attitude was severely diluted by a current generation which now enjoys the comfort of
a more civilized environment. The good life in Colorado, with its skiing and other recreational advantages, exists because of the careful
management of our limited water resources. Many people, often referred to as "environmentalists," have the attitude that water should be
preserved by leaving it in the streams for the fish and the fishermen,
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and that reservoir construction should be eliminated. These people
do not realize that the population of the United States is constantly increasing. Denver's population and subsequent water needs will continue to increase for many years to come. The current political trend
is to prevent further development of water supplies and to limit development by public agencies, rather than to allow the private entrepreneur to invest his money and talent in order to meet the new needs of
our growing community. This is a big change in the water law scene.
The seventeen western states are generally semi-arid. All have
adopted what is known as the appropriation doctrine with respect to
the use of streams. To encourage the development of water for beneficial use and to create a civilized community out of relatively barren
public domain, early miners, farmers, and other settlers were encouraged to expend their energy (and what little money they had) to divert
water from the natural streams and then apply it to beneficial uses,
such as growing crops, manufacturing, and supplying towns and cities.
The appropriation doctrine was created by custom. This new law was
fortified later by constitutional provisions, state and federal statutes,
and court decisions. The new law gave a priority right, over later developers, to whoever was willing to spend the time and money necessary to put water to beneficial use. Thus, in times of shortage, a priority right assured the settler priority against others, some perhaps
located farther upstream than the early settler, from taking the water
which the early settler had applied to beneficial use. This system, used
throughout the western United States, has been successful in turning
what was a barren wilderness into a productive and civilized portion of
the nation.
In permit states, where a water right cannot be created except by
permission from the government, the permit specifies the amount of
time allowed for completion of the physical structures needed to put
the water to beneficial use. The government official issuing the permit
determines what he considers to be an appropriate time within which
to complete the project. Provisions for extending that time are made
by statute. The standard for determining how much time is necessary
to complete a project is unclear. From a practical standpoint, the
courts consider the determination made by the issuing official to be
correct unless it is clearly arbitrary or unreasonable. The courts have
repeatedly recognized that a water right is created by the concurrence
of intent to appropriate water and manifestation of that intent. Property rights have been protected by conditional decrees because the
courts have respected the protection of individual property rights
against forfeiture to the government.
Of all the western states, Colorado has the simplest water system.
In every other appropriation state, whoever wants to develop water
must get permission from a government employee, usually the State
Engineer, before he can proceed. Until permission is granted, the
user does not have a date of appropriation. In Colorado, all the appropriator has to do is form intent to appropriate water and make that
intent known to anyone who might be affected by it. Historically, no
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political influence or governmental authority has been allowed to interfere with the growth of the state. As a result, Colorado has surpassed where it would have been had the people been restricted by
government bureaucracy.
In Colorado, a property right to divert water and apply it to beneficial use is created at the moment intent and the manifestation of that
intent to the general public occurs. Originally, this property right
could be protected only by the uncertainty of a quiet title suit in court.
But one of the first acts of the legislature after Colorado became a
state was to provide a statewide system of adjudicating water rights so
that the extent of any appropriator's right would be determined in an
open, public court proceeding. Enforcement of these rights, as fixed
by the courts, has been administered by the office of the State Engineer.
The priority date of a water right is what gives it value. Often,
many years pass before water appropriated by concurrence of intent
and manifestation of intent can actually be put to beneficial use to
complete the water right. The justification for large expenditures of
money and the expectation of making good on early priority dates has
grown out of the Colorado water law concept called conditional water
rights. From the earliest days, statutes and court decisions provided
that no water may be diverted, regardless of the date of decree, except
for water applied to a beneficial use. Water may not be lawfully
wasted. When a user is finished with his water, he must return any excess to the nearest watercourse for use by others. As a result, when water is diverted from the Colorado River to the Platte River, the Platte
River user may make a succession of uses before he returns that water
to the Platte River for use by others. Denver has taken advantage of
this situation by appropriating its Colorado River water for complete
utilization to the extent it can maintain dominion over such water.
Under procedures carefully established to create Denver's Colorado
River water rights, place of use and amount of storage measurements
were carefully made and followed.
Under these practices, when Denver diverts Colorado River water
for storage in any of its reservoirs, it tracks how much water is stored at
any particular time. Theoretically, water is drawn out of storage in the
same order in which it was stored, although water from different years
is mixed in the same vessel. Since the mere storage of water does not
constitute a beneficial use, this practice became important. Until
stored water is actually used, a decree for that water remains conditional: Denver would have to go to court every four years to show it was
1. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(1) (1998). This provision states: "The state engineer shall be responsible for the administration and distribution of the waters of the
state, and in each division such administration and distribution shall be accomplished
through the offices of the division engineer as specified in this article."
2. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (1998). Section six defines conditional water rights. It states: "'Conditional water right' means a right to perfect a water right
with a certain priority upon the completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon which such water right is to be based."
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continuing to maintain its diligence toward the application of the appropriated water to a beneficial use. Denver maintains records to
show that the water first in storage is the first water out for use. Ideally, Denver will never completely drain all of its reservoirs. However,
in September 1934, the drought situation was so bad that, just before a
major flood occurred, Denver only had a four-day supply of water in
storage. Coupled with the fact that there was almost no water in the
streams for direct diversion, Denver was near catastrophe.
Under the first-in first-out theory, Denver expects to maintain substantial storage at all times to avoid being without water to fight fires or
sustain life. Under the first-in first-out theory, a reservoir can be given
an absolute decree once its full capacity has been used even though it
has not been completely drained and put to beneficial use. By providing for complete treatment of Denver's sewage returns, provisions can
be made so that no transmountain water will be wasted. Only water
that Denver cannot successfully use and reuse will ultimately be returned to the Platte River.
To serve all the city's residents, Denver's decreed rights require
successive use of diverted water through complete rehabilitation of
once used water. While the idea of recycled water may offend the sensibilities of some people, it must be remembered that everybody on the
Mississippi River uses recycled water. New Orleans is regarded as having one of the safest and best water systems in the United States because it has learned to treat Mississippi mud and turn it into beautiful,
potable water. The people downstream from Denver should not be
concerned about using recycled water.
It took Denver many years from the initiation date of its transmountain water rights to construct the facilities necessary to carry the
water to the Denver area. When these water rights were presented to
the courts for adjudication, the time-honored procedure of conditional water rights, by then protected by statute, was used. The courts
recognized the property right to appropriate water as the date intent
was formed and exhibited to the public. A court's decree is conditioned on intent followed diligently by construction of the necessary
structures, and then by actual application of the water to the intended
beneficial use. These conditional decrees recognized the validity of
the water right but conditioned their final validity on perfection of the
water right. The perfection process required application of the water
to beneficial use with due diligence, construction of the facilities, and
actual use of the water. From the earliest days, Colorado residents
have benefited from this procedure, and Denver's situation is simply
illustrative of the value of this conditional decree system.
During the early period of development, the Denver Water Board
employed a man named George M. Bull as its investigative engineer to
develop needed new water resources. On July 4, 1921, he took a party
into the field to make the survey upon which Denver's transmountain
water rights were basically founded. Denver secured a date for its
transmountain diversions for the Fraser and the Williams Fork Rivers
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on July 4, 1921, which it protected against calls on the river from the
lower basin states (principally California and Arizona) by virtue of provisions it secured in the Upper Colorado River Compact.
Denver tried to relate its Blue River priority date to the Fraser and
Williams Fork River projects in order to secure a 1921 priority date.
This attempt failed at the hands of the Colorado Supreme Court.3 Instead, the project received a 1946 priority date and has since been constructed and put into operation. The Blue River Project facilities became more effective due to a 1956 plan in which the Roberts Tunnel
Collection System facilities would bring water to the Dillon Reservoir,
then into the Two Forks Reservoir, and then to the Denver area. The
water rights which were established as a result of Bull's surveys and the
adjudications that followed enabled Denver to supply five million people with water.
A.P. Gumlick devoted most of his time to his job as President of the
Denver Board of Water Commissioners. A very frugal man from an
economic standpoint, Gumlick felt that the people of Denver should
not finance the Blue River project but instead that the project should
be financed by areas outside the city through a United States Bureau
of Reclamation project. To this end, the South Platte Water Users Association was formed with William W. Gaunt, a Brighton attorney, as its
president. This association consisted of Colorado Springs, Douglas
County, Arapahoe County, Adams County, and Jefferson County.
Representatives of these entities met at the high school in Englewood
with E. B. Debler, who was in charge of creating water projects for the
United States Bureau of Reclamation, in an endeavor to create a project now typified by the Colorado-Big Thompson project. The purpose
of this meeting was to develop the Blue River resource without the use
of Denver funds and to supply additional water to all the entities involved. Colorado Springs later joined Aurora in creating water supplies from tributaries of the Colorado River. The effort to turn the
Blue River project into a reclamation project instead of a Denver project failed at the hands of the Colorado Supreme Court, 4 and the idea
was abandoned.
Denver has been innovative in developing Colorado water law in a
number of respects. Denver believed that using water from a natural
stream for exchanges satisfied the criteria for a beneficial use for
which a priority right could be secured. Consequently, before others
began the practice, Denver secured a priority right to use natural
stream waters for exchanges to insure the proper operation of its systems. Recognizing the fungibility of the waters of natural streams,

3. City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d
992 (Colo. 1954). The court refused to grant a 1921 priority date because: (1) Denver
had not made a survey on the ground in the Blue River Basin as it had in the Williams
Fork Basins; (2) Denver had changed its manner of diversion; and (3) Denver failed to
demonstrate continuous effort between 1921 and 1946, the date when the final reservoir plan was approved. Id. at 1000-1001.
4. Id. at 1000.
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statutes since the nineteenth century have authorized the use of these
waters as a vehicle for trading water by placing it in a stream at one
place and removing a like amount at another. With the increasing
demand for use of natural stream water for exchanging flows, it became apparent several decades ago that conflicting demands would
mean that not all desired exchanges could be made. However, since
Denver secured the first decree granting a priority right to use water
for exchange purposes, decrees for this purpose have become quite
common.
Although one expects the United States government to try to help
all of its citizens, some federal agencies have perennially opposed Denver's development of a water supply. Government witnesses testified,
many years ago, that the waters which were appropriated from the
tributaries of the Colorado River were not needed by the people of
Denver. Figures were brought together, particularly by Randy Riter of
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, to show that Denver's population
growth would not be what the Denver Water Department projected.
The Water Department's predictions have been entirely corroborated
by actual events over the last fifty years (1935-1985).
It is not surprising that Denver's estimate of future water needs has
proved accurate. The principal bases for these estimates were
long-range projections by business interests in the community. These
business entities invested and risked their money based on their predictions of the size of the population that would eventually have to be
served with water. The Water Department made its own projections, as
did the gas and electric utility, the telephone utility, and voluntary
commerce and industrial organizations. The 1988 estimates of growth
were challenged by environmental groups opposed to changing the
natural environment. Their aim was to conserve Colorado's rivers.
The beneficiaries of this civilization forget that the loss of natural river
flows has made it possible to live in a civilized environment. Our
highly developed urban, agricultural, and industrial civilization was
created by taking water from natural streams. Often overlooked is the
fact that the eastern slope rivers, such as the Platte and the Arkansas,
supported a very limited irrigation community until reservoirs were
built to store spring floods for use later in the summer.
An example of the great benefit that storage conservation provides
is the South Platte River. By building reservoirs in the mountains,
Denver made it possible to have a year-around supply of water. Much
of that water is used to create a beautiful environment full of trees,
shrubs, flowers and lawns, which now characterize the city that was
once a near desert. These projects, as well as the Aurora project which
brought outside water and storage water into the Platte River, have
created a continuous flow of water in the South Platte River. In the
early days, the South Platte went dry in August or September, so no
suitable nesting habitat could be found for migrating birds along the
Platte in Colorado or Nebraska. There simply was not any water. Bird
habitat was injured by the spring floods which tended to channelize
temporarily and then disappear. After a hundred years of urban and
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irrigation development, the Platte River is now a haven, not only for
people but also for various fish and waterfowl. Every new project for
which there is a water supply such as the Two Forks Reservoir, tends to
increase this natural bounty.
A different phase in the development of the Denver water system
relates to the Williams Fork project. During the Depression of the
1930's, governmental agencies worked to find ways to put the economy
back in motion. Cities, states, and the federal government all promoted public projects. One way to do this was through the Public
Works Administration, under which the United States would pay a
percentage of local public project costs. Although the Denver Charter
required the entire cost of the Denver water system operation to be
paid from rates charged to consumers, nothing in the charter prevented Denver from accepting gifts. Denver's Williams Fork project
provided for a tunnel from the Williams Fork River, a tributary of the
Colorado River, into Clear Creek, a tributary of the South Platte River.
During this period, Denver began having problems treating its
sewage effluent. One potential solution was to use high quality water
to dilute sewage as it entered the South Platte River. There was an
abandoned canal, called the White Cap, which ran from Clear Creek
to a point on the Platte River, where its outfall would mingle with various raw sewage outfalls in Denver before the polluted water would be
used by others. While the waters of the Williams Fork had been appropriated for all municipal purposes, building a canal system and a
tunnel under Jones Pass from the Williams Fork River to Clear Creek
was still in the survey and design stage.
Denver had the good fortune of having its outstanding engineer,
George Bull, selected by the United States government to approve
various public works projects for the region which included Colorado.
Denver Water Board personnel presented a plan to him for immediate
completion of the Williams Fork system and a plan to meet the dilution water requirements of the State Health Department. It did not
take long to convince Mr. Bull-he was already familiar with the program as he had originally designed the outlines and assisted in the
preparation of the appropriation filings.
During construction of the project, the standards for sewage
treatment were raised considerably so that mere dilution was no longer
adequate. The question of whether sewage dilution was a beneficial
use of water did not receive ajudicial determination. But, the system
was put into operation in order to bring water from western Colorado
to the Platte River basin for customary beneficial uses. Instead of using
the White Cap Canal, it was economically feasible to drive the Vasquez
Tunnel from Clear Creek into the Moffat Tunnel system, thus combining the waters of the Williams Fork River with those of the Fraser River
for use in the Denver water system. Because these steps were purely
mechanical and did not change the ultimate purpose of the appropriated water, no court proceedings were required for their consummation.
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To accommodate Denver's need to recycle its sanitary sewage to
meet acceptable standards, it became necessary to move the place of
Denver's sewage effluent return from a point above a major ditch to a
point below that ditch. If the change was made, the ditch would not
have received the same volume of return flow. The ditch company
contested Denver's right to make this change. The Colorado Supreme
Court held that Denver, as the appropriator of the water that went
through the sanitary sewers, was not obligated to continue its practice
of returning such water to a natural watercourse at the same place.'
I conceived of another developed water concept in Pikes Peak Golf
Club, Inc. v. Kuiper. In that case, Roy Pring transformed an area underlain by impervious shale where most of the water was consumed by
plant life. Only occasionally would water spill into Fountain Creek, a
tributary of the Arkansas River. By draining the swampy area and husbanding the water very carefully, a golf course was created and, for the
first time, substantial amounts of water spilled into Fountain Creek.
The State Engineer claimed this water for appropriators on Fountain
Creek and ordered the golf course to cease its operations and effectively deliver the two hundred forty acre-feet that had formerly been
consumed by plant life and evaporation to water users on Fountain
Creek. The Supreme Court held in my favor. Historically, the two
hundred forty acre-feet of water were not tributary waters and were,
therefore, not subject to administration by the State Engineer under
the priority system.' As a result, the golf course was allowed to use the
salvaged water.
At this point, a distinction must be made between developed water
and salvaged water. Developed water is water that was never part of a
natural watercourse, or it is tributary ground water which is really part
of a surface stream. Salvaged water is water that was part of a natural
stream or might become part of a natural stream but for changes
brought about by the act of man. The leading case regarding salvaged
water, Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District v. Shelton Farms,
Inc.,8 is a decision written by Justice Edward C. Day, noted for his practical horse sense approach to solving legal problems. It is well known
that salt cedars in the bed of the Arkansas River, much like cotton5. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No. 1 v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 499 P.2d 1190, 1193-94 (Colo. 1972). The court stated that changes of points
of return of waste water are not governed by the same rules as changes of points of diversion. Id. at 1193. The court also stated it is conceivable that there may be instances
in which a change of point of return may be enjoined, but the present case was not
one of those instances. Id.
6. Pikes Peak Golf Club, Inc. v. Kuiper, 455 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1969).
7. Id. at 884-85. The court stated that the authority of water officials to administer
water is limited to that which has become a part of, or is tributary to, a natural stream.
The court defined a natural stream to consist of surface waters, the underftow which
supports these surface waters, and tributary water. Where a person, by his own efforts
has increased the flow of water in a natural stream, he is entitled to the use of the water to the extent of the increase.
8. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529
P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1975).
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wood trees, evaporate large amounts of water from the stream in which
they are located. In Shelton Farms, landowners removed salt cedars
from their lands and claimed a right to the excess water in the stream
as a result of the removal. This was clearly not a new or developed
source of water and any attempt to define it or administer it without
injuring senior appropriators would have been next to impossible.
The Supreme Court rejected the idea that salvaged water was free from
the call of the river.9
Recently, Red Giffen, a retired Forest Service employee, wrote a
letter to the editor of a Denver newspaper pointing out that in heavily
forested areas very little precipitation, whether rain or snow, ever
reaches the ground so that it flows into streams. He pointed out that
careful timber cutting could result in more water reaching the flowing
streams. Such cutting would leave stands of timber adjacent to clearcut areas where small, newly grown trees would not prohibit precipitation from reaching the ground. Such a procedure, over wide areas,
could produce substantially more water in natural streams. The letter
did not note the cost of this type of timber operation or of replanting.
Those costs would have to be weighed against the cost of cloud seeding
in areas tributary to natural streams where heavy timber cover would
not prevent precipitation from reaching the streams. The need for
such procedures seems to be far in the future, when the population of
the United States increases to the point that water supplies become a
desperate necessity.
On the basis of distinguishing between "speculation" and "appropriation," the Supreme Court recently indicated that unless an appropriator knew where he was going to put the water, had a market for it,
and could demonstrate he had the water, he could not make an appropriation.' Within 60 days of this decision, the Colorado legislature
passed definitive legislation to provide guidelines reaffirming the conditional decree statutes." In an earlier case, an appropriator from the
tributaries of the Fraser River simply said he wanted to use the water in
eastern Colorado, where he knew there was need for a supply. A decree for this appropriation was affirmed. 2 Under this earlier philoso-

9. Id. at 1327.
10. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566 (Colo. 1979). The court stated:
Our constitution guarantees a right to appropriate, not a right to
speculate. The right to appropriate is for Use [sic], not merely for
profit. As we read our constitution and statutes, they give no one
the right to preempt the development potential of water for the anticipated future use of Others [sic] not in privity of contract, or in
any agency relationship, with the developer regarding that use. To
recognize conditional decrees grounded on no interest beyond a
desire to obtain water for sale would as a practical matter discourage
those who have need and use for the water from developing it.
Id. at 568.
11. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (1998); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92103(3) (a) (1998).
12. Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 P.2d 363, 368 (Colo. 1940).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 2

phy, the High Line Canal, which was one hundred fifty miles in length,
was built by English capital to serve land which had not yet been patented and where the settlers had not yet arrived to use the water. Appropriation was confirmed only after the settlers arrived, patented the
land, and put the water to beneficial use."3
As has been correctly stated by the Colorado Supreme Court on
several occasions, water developers, whether public or private, cannot
afford to make great expenditures of money in the development of a
water resource without the assurance of a decree that entitles them to
the water they propose to put to beneficial use. It has always been recognized that such a decree, for its final effectiveness, would be dependent on completion of the appropriation with due diligence. To
assure that the proposed appropriator was not merely speculating, it
was required that he make a showing every four years, in the case of a
project taking many years to develop, that he was diligently pursuing
his appropriation. The four year requirement of a showing of due
diligence was expected to weed out the speculators who might simply
attempt to tie up the water supply of a stream in the hope of someday
finding a way to make use of it. In Vidler, the Colorado Supreme Court
seemed to change its Taussig philosophy. However, the legislature
passed a definitive statute shortly after the decision in Vidler furnished
the criteria on which future decisions of developers and courts must be
based. This assumes, of course, that the legislature had the authority
to pass the statute under the Colorado Constitution and that the Colorado Supreme Court is bound to follow laws as passed by the legislature regardless of personal views.
Rather than further examining Vidler, we therefore looked to the
new statute. Passed in 1986, the first thing to note is that the statute
ratified the granting of conditional decrees. In title 37, article 92, section 103(3) (a) of the Colorado Code, we find the words "but no appropriation of water, either absolute or conditional, shall be held to
occur when the proposed appropriation is based upon the speculative
sale or transfer of the appropriative rights to persons not parties to the
proposed appropriation ...04 Reference to "either absolute or conditional" is a clear ratification of the long-standing practice that decrees for uncompleted appropriations are to be conditioned upon actual appropriation of the water put to beneficial use. The language
continues, giving the courts criteria, not for due diligence, but only for
what is considered to be a speculative appropriation.
13.
14.

Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrigating Co., 17 P. 487 (1888).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1998).

15. Id. The statute defines speculation as a situation where "[tihe purported appropriator of record does not have either a legally vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such interest in the lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation, unless such appropriator is a governmental agency or an agent in fact for
the persons proposed to be benefited by such appropriation." It also provides as
speculative a situation where "[t]
he purported appropriator of record does not have a
specific plan and intent to divert, store, or otherwise capture, possess, and control a

specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses."
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The first criterion for what is to be considered speculative occurs
when the purported appropriator has neither a legally vested interest
nor a reasonable expectation of procuring such an interest in the
lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation. This is true unless the appropriator is a governmental agency or an agent-in-fact for
the persons proposed to be benefited by the appropriation. '6 This
language grants a special preference to a governmental agency or one
who is an agent-in-fact for the persons proposed to be benefited by the
appropriation. Section 6 of article XVI of the Colorado Constitution
militates against any special preference with the words "[tihe right to
of any natural stream to beneficial
divert the unappropriated waters
7
uses shall never be denied.'
Next, it must be noted that, in the Wheeler case, the High Line Canal could not have secured its date of appropriation. Not only did the
builders lack a vested interest in the lands to be served, but the settlers
had not even arrived. On the other hand, the next alternative may
save the situation. The alternative provides that the purported appropriator of record must have a specific plan and intent to divert, store
or otherwise capture, possess, or control a specific quantity of water for
specific beneficial uses. 8 This language almost brings us back to Taussig, but not quite. In Taussig, the appropriator had a general plan to
carry water from tributaries of the Fraser River and the Colorado River
watershed to somewhere in the South Platte River watershed. 9 There
was already a sufficient shortage of water so that it was a practical certainty that someone would make beneficial use of the water once it arrived in the Platte River watershed. A change in the statute required a
specific plan which would necessarily require a fairly close definition,
not only of the source of water, but particularly as to the place and
character of its use. The facts in the Wheeler case should meet this criterion.
While it has always been well-established that the Colorado Constitution authorizes appropriation for use and not for speculation, there
was no legislative definition of speculation until 1979 with the adoption of title 37, article 92, section 103(3) (a) (I) of the Colorado Code.
The language of the statute is somewhat uncertain in that it says "no
appropriation of water... shall be held to occur when the proposed
appropriation is based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights... 20 This language did not specifically eliminate
appropriation by an individual who was personally speculating as to
how he might apply the water to beneficial use, but did eliminate the
individual's speculation with respect to selling or transfering the water.
Such a concept may have little practical relationship to present-day
conditions because appropriations today are made on a relatively large
16. Id.
17. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II) (1998).
19. Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1940).
20. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1998).
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In 1979, the legislature added a new concept with these words:
No claim for a conditional water right may be recognized or
a decree therefor granted except to the extent that it is estab
lished that the waters can be and will be diverted, stored, or
otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be
beneficially used and that the project can and will
2 be com'
pleted with diligence and within a reasonable time.
This language requires an appropriator to have the gift of prophecy. The word "established," if literally applied, would make further
appropriations impossible. When it comes to actual application of this
word, the judiciary will probably relate the word "established" to the
concept of burden of proof. This means that if the evidence makes it
reasonable to assume that there would probably be water available,
and the "specific plan" referred to in title 37, article 92, section
103(3) (a) (II) of the Colorado Code 22 appears by competent evidence
to be supported, a decree can be granted.
The National Reclamation Association ("NRA") was a voluntary
group that represented all of the reclamation states, that is, those
states that relied on the appropriation of water as the basis of their social fabric. The Denver Board of Water Commissioners, which had all
the powers of the city to manage and operate its waterworks system
and plant, strongly supported the NRA. Because of this, and as an attorney for the Board, I held a long tenure on the NRA's Resolutions
Committee. One of the most active NRA programs was integrating
United States' claims for water into the water rights systems of each of
the reclamation states.
Working under the auspices of the NRA, I prepared what was
known as the Barrett Bill, named for the Wyoming representative who
introduced the bill. The bill simply provided that the United States
could only acquire water in a state pursuant to the laws of that state.
This comports with the Reclamation Act, which provides that the
United States, with respect to its reclamation projects, must acquire
water under state law.'
The concept gradually filtered through to
Congress. In 1952, Senator McCarran of Nevada attached the substance of the matter to another bill as an amendment. 4 When Senator

21. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9) (b) (1998).
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II).

23. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994). The provision provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to effect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory
relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the

Secretary of the Interior... shall proceed in conformity with such
laws ....

24. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).

Issue 1

REFLECTIONS ON SIXTY YEARS OF WATER LAIWPRACTICE

15

McCarran brought the matter to the point that there was going to be a
hearing and recommendation to the Senate, I received a telephone
call from Judge Sturrock from Texas. He was active in the NRA. He
said it was time for me to get to Washington and support the association's viewpoint.
In these hearings, my adversary was Bill Veeder, a Colorado lawyer
who practiced law in Colorado Springs, but left to work for the United
States Department ofJustice. Veeder started the Santa Margaritacases
in California (which nearly caused a revolution). 5 He was a very dedicated public servant and truly believed that the United States should
supersede the powers of all individual states. He believed in a dominant federal government and made the case on behalf of the federal
agencies before the Senate Committee. He said the United States had
so many water rights that it would take several years to prepare the
cases for adjudication. Thirty-five years later, the Department of Justice is making the same plea in cases for adjudication of water rights
and is asking for postponement because they have not had time to find
out what they need or want.
The necessity for integrating U.S. water claims into the state administration system was emphasized by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Stone wrote:
Water rights cannot in fact be adjudicated as to part of the
claimants only. They are relative both as to time and
amount. None is certain unless all are determined. If the
contention of Government immunity be true, then all the
many water adjudication proceedings in Colorado and elsewhere in which the rights of the United States have been
submitted by its officers and have been adjudicated by the
court have resulted in decrees void as to the United States
and therefore uncertain as to the rights of all other parties.
If this contention be true, the landowner who is so fortunate
as to have the use of other taxpayers' money through the
Reclamation Bureau in building his reservoir or ditch is exempt from our statutory proceedings for adjudication of his
water rights, and the arm of the state is paralyzed in this vital
function, at least until such time as the officers of the Federal
Government see fit in their superior wisdom to bring action
in the Federal Court.26

25. See California v. United States, 235 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1956). The case concerned an action, brought by the United States, against three thousand defendants to
quiet title to water rights claimed to be appurtenant to lands acquired in 1941-1943
and used for various purposes of the Army and Navy. Id. at 652. The history of this
litigation appears in United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 101 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.
Cal. 1951); United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Cal. 1952);
United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 109 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United

States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 110 F. Supp. 767 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
26. City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d
992, 1011-12 (Colo. 1954).
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The McCarran Amendment allowed parties to join the United
adjudication of rights to the
States as defendants in any suit ',27
"for the
i
use of water from a river system or "for the administration of such
rights.""8 It provided that when the United States was a party to any
such suit, the United States should be deemed to have waived any right
to plead that state laws were inapplicable.2 It also prohibited the
United States from pleading that it is not amendable by reason of its
sovereignty," and that the United States should be subject to the
'judgments, orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction."' "
The effectiveness of the McCarran Amendment was attacked by the
United States. Ken Balcomb, a Glenwood Springs attorney who represented the Colorado River Water Users, took on the Department of
Justice so effectively that the United States Supreme Court held that
the McCarran Amendment meant just what it said: that an adjudication of water rights could be of any substantial segment of a water system and did not have to cover an entire water system, as the United
States insisted. It was an obviously correct decision, and had it gone
pursuant to the contentions of the United States Department of justice, there would have been no tribunal to hear adjudications of the
Colorado River waters that run through seven states.
After passage of the McCarran Amendment, a quiet title suit in a
Salt Lake City federal court was turned back by the federal judge to the
local courts. However, Judge Knous of Montrose, the judge in the
United States District Court in Denver, retained jurisdiction in the
federal court of a quiet title suit by the U.S. Department ofJustice in
an effort to evade the effect of the McCarran Amendment. This would
have been appealed by Denver except that Denver finally worked out a
settlement regarding Denver's Blue River diversions to the United
States Green Mountain Reservoir on the Blue River. The result is now
known as the Blue River Decree. 2 I was living in an oxygen tent at that
time because of asthma. The actual negotiations were carried on by
Harold Roberts, who was assisted by John Dickson. I appeared from
time to time under heavy medication, emerging from my oxygen tent
for a few hours. When it appeared that a negotiated settlement could
not be reached, I contacted Ramsey Clark, a top legal person in the
Department of Justice in Washington, and we worked out the sticking
point by phone so that a negotiated decree was reached.
In spite of the plain language of the McCarran Amendment-that
the United States could not plead that state laws are inapplicable in

27. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994).
28. Id.; see also Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976).
29. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See generally United States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 608 F.2d
422, 426-29 (10th Cir. 1979) (interpreting the Blue River Decree).
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the adjudication of water rights,33 the Colorado Supreme Court, relying on U.S. Superior Court decisions growing out of the protection of4
rights.1
Indian rights, held that the United States has certain reserved
This case has sometimes been referred to as Denver . A similar case
which arose in a different 3water division but covering the same issues
I.5
became known as Denver

Denver I is a leading case resolving the relationship between the
United States government and the people of Colorado with respect to
water. It reflects efforts, commenced more than ten years earlier, to
define the position of the United States. United States officers and
employees had taken the general position that the United States was
above and beyond any authority of the individual sovereign states and
did not have to comply in any respect with state water law. However,
jurisdiction over the United States has been obtained in every water division in the state.
The extent of United States water rights was pushed in Water Divisions No. 1 and No. 5. In Water Division No. 1, in Denver II, the trial
judge, Donald A. Carpenter, entered a declaratory judgment on the
basis of the pleadings. 36 Judge Carpenter had been steeped in water
law from the time he assisted his father, Delph Carpenter, in putting
together the Colorado River Compact. Judge Carpenter held that federal reserved water rights did not exist in Colorado; that Colorado laws
were applicable to the United States; and that by accepting Colorado
into the union, a state whose constitution provided that all of the waters of the state belonged to the state itself, the United States had recognized that the water of the reclamation states belonged to the people of those states.37 It was also noted that the property of the United
States could only be disposed of by an act of Congress, and, with the
statutes just mentioned, there had been a disposal by Congress of the
Court refused to upwaters of the reclamation states. The Supreme
3
hold the trial court's decision in Denver lI.

In Denver I, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged that:
39
"[t]he doctrine of federal reserved water rights is judicially created.
There has never been an act of Congress creating reserved rights. The
Colorado Supreme Court subsequently stated:
Based upon a recognition of Congress' underlying power, the
United States Supreme Court has constructed a body of law,

derived by judicial implication from congressional actions,

33. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a).
34.

United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 17-20 (Colo. 1982) [here-

inafter Denver 1].
35. City & County of Denver v. United States, 656 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1982) (hereinafter Denver I1).
36. See id. at 38.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 39.
39. Denver I, 656 P.2d at 17.
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holding that: "Congress, in giving the President the power to
reserve portions of the federal domain for specific federal
purposes, impliedly authorized him to reserve 'appurtenant
water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purposes of the reservation.' 40
Despite Colorado's peculiar constitutional provision that all waters
of Colorado belong to the people of Colorado,4 ' the Colorado Supreme Court felt obliged to follow the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. It held that the United States does have reserved
rights in unappropriated waters available at the time of a land reservation because without such rights, the purpose of the land reservation
would be wholly defeated. Since then, in a matter concerning the oil
shale claims of the United States, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that the United States can amend an original application; however, the priority date is set on the date of the amendment, not the
date of the original application. It must also be republished as if it
were a new application, thus upholding Colorado's antedation law.43
The first major water rights case in which I was involved was City &
County of Denver v. Sheriff44 The case involved Denver's appropriation
of water for carriage through the pioneer bore of the Moffat Tunnel
from the headwaters of the Fraser River in western Colorado into the
Platte River Basin in eastern Colorado. At that time it was as if Colorado were actually two states: Colorado I, where the capitol was located, east of the Continental Divide, and Colorado II, west of the
Continental Divide. The judges, lawyers, legislators, and local officials
in Colorado II had their own water law for western Colorado. It
seemed as if they had never heard of the Colorado Constitution. Consistent with the theory that the constitution was foreign to those in
Colorado II, the trial judge, Charles C. Herrick, held that Denver
could not transport any water out of the Colorado River Basin until it
had exhausted its water resources in the Platte River Basin. 5
As meticulous, accurate, and faithful to the letter of the law as
Malcolm Lindsey was, he was utterly shocked by this ruling, which was
made from the bench at about 10:30 a.m. one morning. Afterwards,
the judge announced that the court would reconvene at one o'clock to
hear motions. It was a fine day, so A. P. Gumlick and I thought about
what had to be done in court after lunch and decided to enjoy the day.
Lindsey went off by himself in a high state of disbelief to prepare a mo-

40. Id.
41. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. The provision provides: "The water of every natural

stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared
to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of
the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided."
42. Denver 1, 656 P.2d at 19-20.
43. United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986).
44. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1939).
45. See generally id.
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tion for a new trial. When we got back to court at one o'clock, Lindsey
was so upset that after two sentences he turned the matter over to me.
I thereupon dictated the basis for the decree I thought we ought to
have. This basis subsequently became the decision of the Colorado
Supreme Court, which affirmed the constitutional provisions regarding designated uses of the waters of natural streams.46 The court instructed the lower court that the constitution covered the entire state
of Colorado-Colorado II as well as Colorado I.
It should be noted that my views of western Colorado judges extended to their beliefs about transmountain diversions rather than to
their general competency or integrity. The same Judge Herrick, while
sitting in a trial in Brighton, Colorado that required the use of Italian
interpreters, rather violently pounced on a dishonest interpreter who
was giving me trouble even though I was the attorney who was involved
in the Sheriff case. The interpreter did not realize that Judge Herrick
had been raised in the coal mine country of western Colorado and
spoke Italian as fluently as he did English. The very much surprised
interpreter correctly formulated questions and answers after Judge
Herrick vigorously corrected him from the bench.
Because of my law practice outside the Board of Water Commissioner's business, I have also been involved in the application of the
constitutional provision that no special commission created by the legislature may take control of any municipal assets. The Colorado Supreme Court, itself a state agency, has not favored this limitation on
the powers of state agencies and has found ways to limit it, particularly
in the electric field. Under the constitutional provision, a municipally-owned water system may not have its rates or practices governed
by the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, a special commission
created by the legislature." The provision
was followed in a matter in48
volving the Denver Water Department.
Water law has developed to the point where it is more than a question of putting water to beneficial use. It has become the law of water
quality and the character of return flows. It is no longer enough to
have a water supply. When a developer plans to create more housing,
more manufacturing, or more office facilities, water for these enterprises must be disposed of without impairing the quality of the waters
into which the return flows are inserted. Consequently, the field of
water law has become a field of environmental law, in which the legal
adviser must contemplate not only securing a supply but also disposing
of that supply in a safe and economical manner.

46. Id. at 840-45.
47. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 35. The provision provides: "The general assembly shall
not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property, or
effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal
function whatever."
48. City of Englewood v. City & County of Denver, 229 P.2d 667, 671-73 (Colo.
1951).
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Colorado water law is a complete deviation from the old English
common law, which required natural streams to flow undiminished in
quantity. Necessity in this arid region created a new common law that
encouraged the removal of water from streams to meet the needs of a
civilized society. But the law continues to follow the part of the old
English common law that required natural streams to be left unimpaired in quality. In what is known as the Chain O'Mines case, 0 placer
miners in Clear Creek Canyon polluted a stream so that the downstream farms receiving this water were filtering out the mill tailings by
applying it to their fields. In a field of corn which was a quarter mile
in length along the distribution system, the first corn would be a foot
high while the corn at the end of the row would be five or six feet tall.
In a suit to enjoin the miners, District Judge Charles C. Sackmann in
the Denver District Court held that a reasonable amount of discharge
had to be permitted because both the miners and the agriculturists
had to be accommodated." The Colorado Supreme Court reversed
the lower court in the Chain O'Mines case, stating that the miners had
no right to pollute the stream to a quality below that of the natural watercourse.5 ' This was particularly important because it affected the waters of Clear Creek. This early legal pronouncement is emphasized
more and more today.
Decrees giving a fight to divert water for beneficial use referred entirely to volumes of water and not at all to the quality of that water.
This matter came up when the Pueblo Reservoir, constructed in the
stream bed of the Arkansas River, changed the quality of the river.
The Bessemer Ditch, which had always been sealed by the natural
sediment in the Arkansas River, became porous and leaky when the
reservoir provided clear water rather than the heavily sedimented water nature had provided. The court was strongly divided over this case.
The original majority held that an appropriator had the right to the
natural quality of a stream without man-made modifications of that
quality. On rehearing, Justice Don Kelly changed his position and accepted what originally had been the minority view-that only water is
subject to appropriation, and therefore, the appropriator has no right
to the quality of water in the stream as it was in its natural state.53
What the final majority opinion overlooked was the fact that the
Colorado Constitution does not merely state that pure water is subject
to appropriation, but states the "water of every natural stream" is subject to appropriation." This certainly does not refer to distilled water
or pure water. In the dissenting opinion, which originally was the majority opinion byJustice William Erickson, appears the sentence: "I sin-

49. Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 44 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1934).

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1027-28.
A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1978).
Id. at 61-62.
54. COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5.
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55
cerely hope that this Court will reconsider this issue in future years.'
These issues are part of a developing law to which the legislature must
give consideration if it expects the Colorado Supreme Court to avoid
becoming a legislative body to fill a vacuum not filled by the legislature.
The gist of A-B Cattle is that the change in stream content was
man-made because clean water was delivered from the Pueblo Reservoir, just as in Chain O' Mines. Nobody today questions that it is unlawful to dump man-made toxic material into a natural stream. The final
decision in A-B Cattle overlooked the fact that the change in water
quality complained of was man-made. The recent New Mexico case of
EnsenadaLand & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper' involved a transfer of a decreed
right which worked a man-made change in the quality of stream flow.
The court relied on A-B Cattle and allowed the change, again overlooking the fact that the change in water quality was man-made.57
A change in the philosophy of what constitutes a beneficial use has
occurred since 1860. As the United States has developed, Colorado
has become a national asset, not only as an educational and technical
center, but also as a recreational, ranching and agricultural center.
Some of Colorado's best value is found in its high mountains, its forests, and in its streams. A very early statute permitted the floating of
logs on our streams. With modern transportation, this statute can be
repealed as unnecessary. On the other hand, river rafting and kayaking have become major sports and a major economic benefit to Colorado. The diversion of water out of the streams has the effect of diminishing their flow and impairing this kind of use. Long ago when,
such a use was not even considered. It certainly would not have been
thought of as a beneficial use. Beneficial use must necessarily mean
utility for the needs of mankind. Mankind today wants river rafting,
and consequently the maintenance of streams for this use has become
a beneficial use which was not in existence at the time Colorado water
law was first envisioned. However, Colorado law does not adequately
address this problem: it attempts to give the state of Colorado the sole
right to appropriate water for this beneficial use, even though the constitution clearly says that the right to appropriate water for beneficial
use shall never be denied to anyone.58

55.
56.
57.
58.

A-B Cattle, 589 P.2d at 62.
Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 792.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. The provision provides:
The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream
to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation
shall give the better right as between those using the water for the
same purpose; but when the waters of any natural stream are not
sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same,
those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the
water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes.
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Water diversion is totally unnecessary for the preservation of Colorado's forests except for the low value Blue Spruce, which must have its
feet wet. Other evergreens obtain all their water nourishment from
their needles. However, forests can provide substantial storage where
the trees are open, so that they act as a windbreak to drop blowing
snow into open space where it can reach natural watercourses. Under
a law passed by the United States Congress, the national forests are to
be maintained for the purpose of providing a continuous supply of water and timber.59 These two objectives are consistent. Timber cutting
provides open space for precipitation to fall. It also improves the flow
of air so that snow and rain will get to the earth, where both timber
and water are supplied. This is why there should be no wilderness areas where there are forests because they are unproductive and inaccessible for recreation to about 98% of the American public. Cutting
trees to create ski slopes provides open space where snow can fall and
also provides economic benefit to the state. Ski areas require a domestic water supply, which means that a substantial amount of
high-altitude water must to be retained to sustain the ski industry.
Waters from Colorado's natural watercourses flow out of the state
and into other states. Broadly speaking, legal rights to the waters of
interstate streams are treated the same way as waters moving from one
fully sovereign state to another. In Europe, water moves in international streams from one nation to another. Each of these nations is
sovereign. The same thing is true of the states of the United States except to the extent that the states have given up a portion of their sovereignty to the Union. The basic law of interstate streams in the
United States is the same as the law of international streams between
fully sovereign nations. There are many refinements, but basically,
each sovereign has the right to an equitable apportionment of the waters of an interstate stream. The equity is based on preservation of the
existing civilization. This requires consideration of matters such as
maintenance of commerce and water quality. International law protecting commerce is strongly influenced by the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution, as recently illustrated in Sporhase v. Nebraska,60 a matter not directly within the experience of the writer.
Well within the immediate experience of the writer, however, is the
Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River Compact.
The operation of the terms of the Colorado River Compact should be
of great concern to the Upper Basin states. The Lower Basin states of
the Colorado River Drainage Basin endeavor to create a perception
that, aside from the Mexican commitment, the states of the Upper Basin must supply them with 7.5 million acre-feet of water from the Colorado River at Lee's Ferry each year, regardless of any deficiency in
59. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1994). The provision states that "[n]o national forest shall be
established, except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the
purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States .
60. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1981).
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runoff. If there is less than 15 million acre-feet of water available at
Lee's Ferry in any year, the entire shortage must be borne by the Upper Basin. The time is approaching when this concept should be rectified.
Article III (a) of the compact apportions 7.5 million acre-feet of water to the Upper Basin and 7.5 million acre-feet to the Lower Basin.
When the compact was entered into, it was thought that there were
substantially more than 15 million acre-feet available for diversion. Article 111(b) therefore provided for the Lower Basin to increase its beneficial consumptive use by 1 million acre-feet per year. In addition,
paragraph (c) provided water for the Republic of Mexico in the event
of a surplus above the 16 million acre-feet provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b). Subparagraph (c) also provided that if there was
not a sufficient surplus to meet the Mexican obligation, the burden of
any such deficiency would be borne equally by the Upper and Lower
Basins, again emphasizing an equal division of responsibility. Subparagraph (f) provided for a further equitable apportionment, any
time after October 1, 1963, if the 16 million acre-feet had been totally
consumed. Since 1963, the river has never reached 15 million
acre-feet, and consequently, all thought of a further apportionment
has been abandoned. In order to avoid the injury which might occur
as the result of a particularly dry year or dry period, article 111(d) attempted to implement equal division of water between the Upper and
Lower Basins by providing a ten-year running average of 75 million
acre-feet, rather than requiring 7.5 million acre-feet each and every
year.
Article 111(c) does not provide a mechanism to address the additional apportionment provided for in article 111(b) in the event of a
shortage, but it clearly makes the additional apportionment of article
111(b) water a burden to be borne equally by the Upper and Lower Basins. Careful consideration should be given to the proposition that article III(b) apportionment was not intended to interfere with the basic
apportionment of the 15 million acre-feet, but was only supposed to be
effective if there was a surplus over that amount. Those in the Upper
Basin who are responsible for implementation of the Colorado River
Compact and the Upper Colorado River Compact need to keep in
mind that article 111(a) and (b) are apportionments of water. Article
III(d) is not an apportionment, but simply a device to implement the
apportionment. When the Lower Basin seeks to use article III(d) as a
guarantee of 7.5 million acre-feet of water annually, it must bear in
mind that there is an evident intent in the compact to divide the water
equally between the Upper and Lower Basins. Article III(d) is simply
an ill-conceived manner of dividing the water equally based on a mutual mistake of fact.
The State Engineer's office is well aware of the fact that of the
twenty-six years of recorded flow at Lee's Ferry prior to the negotiation
of the compact, the last twenty-four years far exceeded 150 million
acre-feet per decade of water available for division. The fact is that the
division was made on recorded flows which were the highest in the en-
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tire history of the Colorado River and have not been met since the
making of the compact. The facts were sufficiently obscure at the time
of the compact negotiations so that the states believed there would be
a substantial amount of water available for further division among
them in the future. To that end, they provided a date for future diversion. The date has long since passed, and there is no surplus. As a
matter of fact, there is a deficiency of water when full utilization of allotment is made by each state.
In addition to physically recorded flows, we now have access to tree
ring records which confirm the fact that the compact was made on a
mistaken set of facts. For instance, the flows used as the basis for division of water among the Colorado River Basin states were the highest
since the year 1500. In addition, we are now aware of five drought periods which have occurred in the course of history that lasted more
than thirty years each. It is now also certain that the flows at Lee's
Ferry are much less than the 15 million acre-feet of water needed between the Upper and Lower Basins. In fact, the river may become so
deficient that unless there is equal division between the Upper and
Lower Basins, in which the Upper Basin is held to a 75 million
acre-foot delivery at Lee's Ferry for each successive ten-year period,
there will be a substantial reduction in water for the Upper Basin
states.
As a matter of equity and justice, the Lower Basin is entitled to
know now, before it spends more money on further water development, that it does not have an assured supply of 75 million acre-feet
every ten successive years. The time has come for the Upper Basin
states to join together in litigation in order to reform the Colorado
River Compact, which is a contract and a treaty among the states. Reformation of a contract can be made to conform to the true facts because the contract was made upon the basis of a mutual mistake of
fact. The reformation should be on the basis of securing an equal division between the Upper and the Lower Basins which would simply require a change of the number to meet the now proven situation.
There is no reason to try to renegotiate the entire Colorado River
Compact. It has been in operation for more than 60 years. It is the
basis for judicial decisions, the Upper Basin Compact, and federal legislation. These all rely on the equal division of water between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River. The principles of the
compact are sound: an equal division of water between the Upper and
the Lower Basins. The compact should simply be reformed to reflect
its intent in light of the now known availability of water.
From a tacit standpoint, Colorado should not undertake a reformation effort alone. This should be a unanimous effort by all of the
Upper Basin states. Colorado has historically been the leader, not only
in creating water law but also in creating relations with other states.
This is true, due not only to the capability of its people, but because
water flows out of Colorado into other states with practically no water
flowing into Colorado. This creates a necessity for Colorado to protect
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its interests either by judicial decision or compact involving downstream states. Although the principles stated above were delineated by
a group of Coloradans a number of years ago, it turned out that the
political climate was adverse for Colorado to exercise leadership at that
point.

